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I. INTRODUCTION
The installment real estate contract is often called the"poor man's mortgage."' Historically, it was used by sellers to
finance land sales when there was no institutional funding avail-
able or when the buyer could not meet institutional lender crite-
ria for funding. Once again, due to high interest rates and the
unavailability of institutional funds, sellers are financing prop-
erty sales with the poor man's mortgage.
Given the long history and recent increased use of the
installment real estate contract (hereinafter referred to as the
"installment contract"), it might be expected that the underly-
ing doctrine was well-understood and furnished a high degree of
certainty and predictability to the parties. Sadly, this is not so.
Much confusion exists in Washington law about the nature of
the respective interests of the buyer and seller in property that
is subject to an installment land contract. Most of the confusion
results from one line of decisions that held that the buyer had
no interest, legal or equitable, in property being purchased
under an installment contract containing a forfeiture clause.'
This line, of course, includes the infamous Ashford v. Reese.3
Ashford was overruled after fifty years of making mischief. The
Ashford legacy, however, still causes confusion about whether
Washington courts apply the doctrine of equitable conversion. It
is also still unclear which legal principles Washington courts
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law, 1983-84. Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. California State College at Los
Angeles, B.A., 1967; U.C.L.A., J.D., 1970.
1. The installment contract is a seller-financing device with seller retaining legal
title as security for payment of the purchase price.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 8-13.
3. 132 Wash. 649, 233 P. 29 (1925), overruled, Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler, 88
Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631 (1977).
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should use to solve real estate contract problems.
In addition to the confusion created by Ashford, further
confusion results from the failure to distinguish between the
installment contract, wherein seller retains legal title as security
for performance, and the marketing or earnest money contract,
wherein the parties intend that title will be transferred to the
buyer after a short closing period. The installment contract
resembles a mortgage because it divides the incidents associated
with property ownership between the parties to the contract.4
Typically, however, the earnest money contract does not give
any incidents of ownership to the buyer. Yet, in cases involving
both kinds of contracts, courts often decide cases by applying
property labels without considering relevant contract doctrine.
It is the principal thesis of this article that property and
contract questions should not be solved independently and are
most usefully approached in a distinct order. Because the
installment contract divides the incidents of property ownership
usually associated with legal title between the parties to the con-
tract, it should be treated differently than the earnest money
contract in which the incidents of ownership are not divided. In
addition, it is important to first answer some remedial questions
before proceeding to make decisions about the property interest
of each party to the contract. To support this thesis, this article
will explain in detail how the Ash ford legacy has affected the
treatment of real estate contracts in Washington. It will then
compare the Washington approach with the doctrine of equita-
ble conversion. Finally, it will suggest an analysis for real estate
contract problems and apply that analysis to some remaining
problem areas.
II. THE FORFEITURE CLAUSE AND EQUITABLE CONVERSION
Prior to the appearance of the Ashford line of cases, the
Washington Supreme Court had developed a consistent
approach to real estate contracts. The decisions recognized that
both parties to the contract had equitable interests with respect
to the property.5 Moreover, legal and equitable remedies attend-
4. See infra text accompanying notes 48-69.
5. Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75 Wash. 490, 493-94, 135 P. 240, 241-42 (1913). See
also Barton v. Tombari, 120 Wash. 331, 207 P. 239 (1922), afl'd, 124 Wash. 696, 213 P.
1119 (1923); Conelly v. Malloy, 106 Wash. 464, 180 P. 469 (1919); Jackson v. White, 104
Wash. 643, 177 P. 667 (1919).
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ant upon those interests and the contract itself were consistently
treated in the decisions. Following the appearance of Ashford,
however, the courts began to treat questions about the nature of
the "property" interest of each party in the subject matter of
the transaction as separate from the contract aspects of the
transaction. Now that Ashford is overruled, there should be no
impediment to recognizing that both property and contract
questions are present in each transaction, and to using principles
from both doctrinal areas to resolve real estate contract cases.
A. The Ashford Problem
Although the judicial treatment of the installment contract
forfeiture clause and its relationship to other remedies were
established early and fairly consistently applied,7 a separate line
of cases appeared wherein the courts stated that the purchaser
had absolutely "no title or interest, either legal or equitable," in
property that was subject to an installment contract containing
a forfeiture clause.
The notion that the purchaser had no interest in the prop-
erty that was the subject matter of the contract if the contract
contained a forfeiture clause blossomed in Schaefer v. Gregorye
and Ashford v. Reese.9 Both were risk-of-loss cases. In Schaefer,
the seller was unable to deliver title to the buyer because the
property under contract had been condemned for use as a mili-
tary base; in Ashford, the buildings on the property under con-
tract had been destroyed by fire. In both cases, the purchasers
were permitted to rescind the contract and recover the purchase
price. The court reasoned in each instance that the purchaser
had no interest in the property subject to the contract because
the contract contained a forfeiture clause. The loss, therefore,
6. The seller could enforce the contract by specific performance, Wood v. Mastick, 2
Wash. Terr. 64, 69, 3 P. 612, 614 (1881), or recover for damages for breach, Hogan v.
Kyle, 7 Wash. 595, 598-99, 35 P. 399, 399-400 (1893). The seller could also recover for
installments as they fell due, Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297, 300, 34 P. 1100, 1100-01
(1893). Accord, Auve v. Wenzlaff, 162 Wash. 368, 298 P. 686 (1931); Asia Inv. v. Levin,
118 Wash. 620, 204 P. 808 (1922); Roy v. Vaughan, 100 Wash. 345, 170 P. 1019 (1918).
The seller might, however, be bound by specific contract language requiring that she use
the forfeiture remedy exclusively, Wright v. Suydam, 72 Wash. 587, 131 P. 239 (1913), or
be barred by laches from electing any remedy other than forfeiture, Hogan, 7 Wash. at
600-02, 35 P. at 401.
7. See supra notes 5-6.
8. 112 Wash. 408, 192 P. 968 (1920).
9. 132 Wash. 649, 233 P. 29 (1932).
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had to fall on the holder of legal title, the seller, who could no
longer deliver his promised performance.
The reasoning in these cases drew immediate criticism. The
dissenting judges in Ashford demonstrated quite clearly that
nothing in Washington precedent justified the statement that an
installment contract purchaser had no property interest in the
subject matter of the contract.' 0 Law review commentators also
pointed out that nothing about the presence or absence of a for-
feiture clause in a contract supported such a statement." The
seller was not required to elect forfeiture; it simply was one of
the remedial options open to the seller in the event the buyer
defaulted.1"
The Ashford court believed that it had to decide that either
the buyer or the seller had the "property" that was the subject
of the contract in order to decide which of the parties to the
contract would bear the loss. This position is understandable
because the doctrine of equitable conversion, the principal
means for placing risk of loss in the real estate contract setting,
was based on a similar premise-that risk of loss must be
assigned to the party who had the property." In fact, however, it
is quite impossible to decide which party to an installment con-
tract has "real property," because the usual incidents associated
with ownership are divided between the parties in an install-
ment land contract. A brief exploration of some of the well-
known principles underlying the areas of contract and property
10. Id. at 652-66, 233 P. at 30-35.
11. See, e.g., Schweppe, Rights of a Vendee Under an Executory Forfeitable Con-
tract for the Purchase of Real Estate: A Further Word on Washington Law, 2 WASH. L.
Rav. 1, 9 (1926); Schweppe, The New Forfeiture Clause Test in Executory Contracts for
the Sale of Real Estate, 3 WASH. L. REV. 80, 84-85 (1928). But see Lantz, Rights of
Vendees Under Executory Contracts of Sale, 3 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1928).
12. Forfeiture is a remedy dependent upon the terms of contract. It is not a remedy
possessed by the seller unless specifically written into the contract. Taylor v. Interstate
Inv. Co., 75 Wash. 490, 494-95, 135 P. 240, 241-42 (1913). The boilerplate language neces-
sary to provide the remedy developed early. The contract provides that "time is of the
essence" in performance of the contract, and permits the seller to declare that the
buyer's rights are forfeited if performance is not prompt. Contract language also typi-
cally allows the seller to keep all contract payments previously made by the buyer. If a
"time is of the essence" provision is not contained in the contract, the purchaser has the
entire contract period within which to pay. Lillis v. Steinbach, 51 Wash. 402, 404, 99 P.
22, 23 (1909). See infra note 52 for a discussion of infirmities in remedies.
13. Risk of loss was given to the holder of equitable title, the buyer, after the con-
version. 2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 368 (S. Symons 5th ed.
1941); 3 AMmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.22 (Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
AMEIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY].
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will illustrate the difficulty of placing a label on an interest that
amounts to less than the full panoply of rights we associate with
legal title.
The law of property jealously guards the formalities accom-
panying the transfer of property, particularly real property, lest
that bundle of rights we call "ownership" will not be acquired."
Without appropriate transfer, a buyer is left without rights to
the property; she has only contract or tort claims. A contract
claim can, of course, ultimately lead to a transfer of full legal
ownership to the buyer, because specific performance is rou-
tinely awarded in cases where the subject matter of the contract
is real property.'6 In order to obtain specific performance, how-
ever, a buyer must tender her own promised performance and
pay the entire purchase price.' 6 This is the typical earnest
money situation. There is usually no need to worry about
whether a buyer has rights in the property under this agree-
ment, because such rights can be acquired as described above.
More importantly, a buyer will not usually receive any of the
usual incidents of real property ownership under the terms of an
earnest money agreement.
The installment contract presents a different problem.
Because legal title, together with the incidents of ownership it
represents, remains in the seller, the formalities of legal transfer
have not been observed, and theoretically the buyer can have no
legal interest in the property.17 Nonetheless, it is common to
transfer such important incidents of property ownership as the
right to possession to the installment buyer under the real estate
contract itself. The buyer is not, however, in a position to
require formal transfer of any property rights associated with
the incident of ownership because part of the buyer's own per-
formance is still owed to the seller. 8
14. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 13, § 366.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]; 5A A. CORBIN, CORIN ON CONTRACTS § 1143 (1964).
16. Tender is required as a concurrent condition. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, §
234; 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 689 (1960); Reese v. Westfield, 56 Wash. 415,
419, 105 P. 837, 839 (1909).
17. Without legal title neither the common-law real action nor the "modern" eject-
ment action could be maintained. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 13, § 366. Therefore, equity
became the only available forum.
18. A distinction was drawn, therefore, between a seller seeking forfeiture after a
default in intermediate installments, and a seller seeking forfeiture after a default in the
last installment. The latter was required to tender the deed representing her perform-
ance as a condition to forfeiture. Reard v. Ephrata Orchards, 78 Wash. 180, 185, 138 P.
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If the parties to the contract agree to divide the incidents of
ownership between the seller and the buyer over a period of
time, it is incorrect to think of the seller as the "owner" of the
property; some of the most important attributes of that owner-
ship have been transferred to someone else. It is similarly inap-
propriate in property terms to think of the purchaser as the"owner," because the purchaser has only some of the rights asso-
ciated with ownership, not the full panoply of rights the law rec-
ognizes as legal ownership. The real problem then with the
installment contract is that the property concepts associated
with it do not work well. The parties have contractually divided
the usual incidents of property ownership between themselves;
yet property concepts appear to demand that we apply the label"owner" to one or the other, but not to both.
The question of who shall be treated as the owner of prop-
erty subject to a real estate contract is compounded by the pres-
ence of a forfeiture clause. The attributes of ownership that
have been transferred to the buyer may be lost if the seller exer-
cises the contractual right to terminate them under the forfei-
ture clause.1 e The substantial property rights already transferred
are then subject to sudden and complete extinction. Put more
678, 680 (1914). This position has been rigorously criticized as a misapplication of theory.
A seller seeking forfeiture is declaring that the contract is at an end and is seeking to
keep the contract payments previously made as liquidated damages. Tender should be
required only when the seller wants specific performance on the ground that it is inequi-
table to permit the seller to have both the land and the purchase price. 3A A. CosmN,
supra note 16, § 689 (1964).
19. Where seller keeps legal title as security for performance of an installment con-
tract, she has an equitable right, derived from the legal title, to compel the buyer to
perform the contract by paying the purchase price or to bar the buyer's rights under the
contract. 3 AMzmcAN LAW Or PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.73. The device used to
accomplish this was foreclosure of the vendor's lien in equity. Foreclosure resulted in
removing the cloud on title represented by the buyer's "equity" or the right to complete
performance of the contract. The buyer's interest in an installment contract was fore-
closed regularly in early Washington cases. Aylward v. Lally, 147 Wash. 29, 264 P. 983
(1928); Barton v. Tombari, 120 Wash. 331, 207 P. 239 (1922); Roy v. Vaughan, 100 Wash.
345, 170 P. 1019 (1918); Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 P. 240 (1913);
St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Bolton, 5 Wash. 763, 32 P. 787 (1893). These cases
proceeded either on the theory that the seller's equitable lien was being foreclosed, or
that the contract itself was being foreclosed as an "equitable mortgage." Foreclosure by
sale was ordered and deficiency judgments were awarded following the sale. See, e.g.,
Roy v. Vaughan, 100 Wash. 345, 170 P. 1019; Aylward v. Lally, 147 Wash. 29, 264 P. 983.
Forfeiture is foreclosure of the vendor's lien by operation of a condition subse-
quent-the forfeiture clause-contained in the contract. 3 AMEmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 13, § 11.76. See also infra note 94 for a discussion of the way Ashford
affected foreclosure of the vendor's lien.
Dispelling the Ashford Cloud
starkly, we are simply not accustomed to thinking that someone
has "property" if it can be lost by the exercise of a "mere" con-
tract right.
B. A Comparison of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion
and Ashford
The doctrines developed by courts of equity and Ashford
approached this problem of contractually divided incidents of
ownership in diametrically opposed ways. Equity courts, bymeans of the doctrine of equitable conversion, transferred com-
plete ownership rights to the purchaser;'* Ashford transferred
none.21 The history and development of the doctrine of equita-
ble conversion provide a clue to the reason for equity's approach
to the problem of ownership.
The doctrine of equitable conversion was a fiction invented
by the English courts of Chancery to deal with a problem spe-
cific to property.22 If either party to a land sale contract died
while the contract was executory, it was necessary to settle the
question of whether the decedent had real or personal property.
This question required an answer because legal title to real
property descended to the party's heirs or devisees upon the
party's death. By contrast, personal property passed to the per-
sonal representative of the decedent's estate. For example, the
seller's heirs or devisees were not parties to the contract and not
necessarily bound to perform it. At the same time, the purchaser
was an "innocent party" who presumably should not lose theright to continue performance of the contract and receive what
had been bargained for-the property. On the other side of the
coin, it was necessary to determine who had the right to receive
the purchase money if the contract was performed, the heirs or
devisees or the personal representative of the deceased seller's
estate. 2
20. 3 AMEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.22.
21. "[W]e have consistently held in numerous cases that an executory contract of
sale in this state conveys no title or interest, either legal or equitable, to the ven-
dee. . . ." Ashford, 132 Wash. at 650, 233 P. at 30.
22. See generally 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.22. The doc-
trine began in the early seventeenth century and "reach[ed] logical symmetry some two
hundred years later in the decisions of Lord Eldon. . . ." Id.23. In equitable conversion states, equitable interests in land devolve as land to the
purchaser's heir or devisee. Id. § 11.27. There is a split of authority on the question ofwhether the heir or devisee is entitled to have the contract balance paid out of the per-
sonal assets of the estate. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R. 3d 1023 (1965). But see In re
19841
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Equity neatly solved this problem with the doctrine of equi-
table conversion. Under the doctrine, once an enforceable con-
tract was concluded between the parties, equity converted the
legal estate of the seller into an equitable estate in the buyer.
Equity simply transferred all of the important incidents of
ownership to the buyer and left the seller only with what was
described as "bare legal title. 2 4 Each became a trustee for the
other: the seller of legal title for the buyer, and the buyer of the
purchase price for the seller. Once it was established that in
equity the estate had been converted from the seller to the
buyer, questions concerning real and personal property could be
answered easily and neatly. The buyer had real property because
the incidents of ownership had been transferred to her. The
seller had personal property, the right to the purchase money.
Contract rights were protected from the vicissitudes of untimely
death, and time-honored property principles were not violated.
The Ashford court also considered the problem of a division
of the incidents of ownership between the parties to a real estate
contract. It took a wholly different approach, however, and
decided that the buyer had no interest in the property.2 5 The
court reasoned that the presence of a forfeiture clause in the
contract made it possible that the purchaser would never
acquire rights in the property until the contract had been fully
performed.26 Consequently, the court ignored the fact that cer-
tain incidents of ownership, such as possession, had already been
contractually given to the contract purchaser. The court
announced that it would award the purchaser rescission and res-
titution of the amounts she had already paid on the contract
because she had no interest in the property, and therefore
should not bear the risk of loss to the buildings on the property.
The Ash ford court in fact reached its decision based on
unarticulated contract principles, although it claimed to be
deciding on property grounds. It need not have chosen either to
the exclusion of the other, and the result has plagued the under-
McNulta's Estate, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389 (1932) (holding that the executor is not
required to pay the contract balance from the estate).
24. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 13, § 368; 3 ASmmCAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note
13, § 11.22.
25. See supra note 21.
26. As previously mentioned, this was the only time the buyer could compel transfer
of legal ownership through specific performance, since she had fully tendered her own
performance. See supra note 16.
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lying equitable conversion doctrine ever since. The plaintiff in
Ashford had a contractual basis to suspend performance of her
obligations and seek restitution-partial failure of consideration
due to destruction of the subject matter of the contract.2 7 This
was sufficient to permit the court to grant the relief sought
regardless of whether the plaintiff had an interest in the
property.28
C. Evaluation of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion and
Ash ford
The decision in Ashford furnished the basis for the argu-
ments that the purchaser under a real estate contract has no
interest in the property that is the subject of the contract until
the contract is fully performed, and that Washington does not
subscribe to the doctrine of equitable conversion. The first prin-
ciple was argued repeatedly. With few exceptions, however, the
broad principle was never applied in the decisions, and the
rights recognized in the purchaser steadily grew.2 9 Although the
27. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
28. The question that should have been addressed by the court was whether the
damage to the subject matter of the contract was so extensive that the buyer could sus-
pend performance and receive restitution of amounts previously paid. Some Washington
cases have denied this relief if the damage was slight, or if damages were easily ascertain-
able and could be compensated by an abatement of the purchase price. See, e.g., Mast v.
Hoover, 126 Wash. 148, 217 P. 718 (1923); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Convey, 175
Wash. 224, 27 P.2d 136 (1933). This position is now known as the "Massachusetts rule"
for dealing with vendor-purchaser risk-of-loss problems. 3 AMEIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 13, § 11.30.
29. The purchaser's interest is mortgageable and assignable, Kendrick v. Davis, 75
Wash. 2d 456, 460, 452 P.2d 222, 225 (1969), and may be homesteaded, Desmond v.
Shotwell, 142 Wash. 187, 189, 252 P. 692, 692 (1927). The purchaser may protest the
formation of a special district as an owner, Committee of Protesting Citizens v. Val Vue
Sewer Dist., 14 Wash. App. 838, 842, 545 P.2d 42, 44 (1976), and may share in the distri-
bution of the assets of a special district that is dissolved, In re Horse Heaven Irrigation
Dist., 11 Wash. 2d 218, 236-37, 118 P.2d 972, 980 (1941). The purchaser has the equitable
right to complete performance of the contract and the right not to be disturbed in pos-
session by the seller, Pratt v. Rhodes, 142 Wash. 411, 416, 253 P. 640, 641-42 (1927), and
the right to contest a quiet title action to the property before legal title has passed,
Turpen v. Johnson, 26 Wash. 2d 716, 727, 175 P.2d 495, 501 (1946). The purchaser's
interest in the property may be attached by his creditors, State ex rel Oatey Orchard Co.
v. Superior Court, 154 Wash. 10, 12, 280 P. 350, 350 (1929), subjected to execution and
sale as real property, Eckley v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 30 Wash. 2d 96, 106, 190 P.2d
718, 723 (1948), and is "real estate" within the meaning of the judgment lien statute,
Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler, 88 Wash. 2d 777, 784, 567 P.2d 631, 634 (1977).
But see Daniels v. Fossas, 152 Wash. 516, 518, 278 P. 412, 413 (1929) (purchaser not
a "freeholder"); Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manheim, 75 Wash. 641, 644-45, 135 P. 658, 659
(1913) (deceased purchaser has no community property interest capable of descending to
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Washington Supreme Court has refused to adopt the doctrine of
equitable conversion, it has consistently described the seller's
interest in the property in the same way the interest is described
in equitable conversion states.8 0 Therefore, it seems safe to say
that neither principle is actually reflected in the cases.
Neither the doctrine of equitable conversion nor the refusal
to recognize any property interest in the purchaser is a particu-
larly satisfactory approach for solution of all real estate contract
problems. Both are all-or-nothing solutions to problems that are
not all-or-nothing problems. The doctrine of equitable conver-
sion was designed to answer questions that required distinctions
between real and personal property. It was applied to answer
questions other than the real property-personal property ques-
tion because the "conversion"-the transfer of beneficial owner-
ship-was broad enough to permit it. The Ashford approach was
similarly inappropriate when in fact some of the incidents of
ownership had been transferred to the buyer. Equitable conver-
sion and its Ashford mirror image have almost no theoretical
connection with the way courts do or ought to solve real estate
contract problems where the incidents of ownership have been
divided between the parties.
Part of the unsuitability of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion may be traced to its theoretical underpinnings. It rests on
the equitable maxim that equity "regards that as done which
ought to be done," 81 as well as on the presumed intention of the
parties. What ought to be done and what the parties likely con-
heirs); accord, In re Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678, 680-81, 233 P. 293, 294 (1925). The
broad statements made in Tieton and Kuhn's Estate were disapproved in In re Marriage
of Harshman, 18 Wash. App. 116, 124, 567 P.2d 667, 672 (1977).
30. The seller's right to receive contract payments is personal property, and is sepa-
rate and distinct from the naked legal title retained as security. Freeborn v. Seattle
Trust & Say. Bank, 94 Wash. 2d 336, 340-41, 617 P.2d 424, 426-27 (1980). The decedent
seller's interest in property under contract was personal property. In re Estate of
Eilermann, 179 Wash. 15, 18, 35 P.2d 763, 765 (1934). Indeed, the court had held, just
two years prior to Ashford, that a seller held the land in trust for a buyer whose contract
was not in breach. Culmback v. Stevens, 158 Wash. 675, 680-81, 291 P. 705, 707 (1930).
The court never repudiated this position, even after overruling Ashford, and has always
described the seller's interest in terms identical to the terms used in the doctrine of
equitable conversion. See also Meltzer v. Wendell-West, 7 Wash. App. 90, 497 P.2d 1348
(1972); Biehn v. Lyon, 29 Wash. 2d 750, 189 P.2d 482 (1948). Nonetheless, in Cascade
Bank, 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631, the court refused to adopt the doctrine of equita-
ble conversion. See also Reed v. Eller, 33 Wash. App. 820, 827, 664 P.2d 515, 518
(1983)(holding that vendees do not become bona fide purchasers until they have paid the
contract price, thus acquiring legal title).
31. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 13, §§ 363-77, at 8.
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templated when they entered the contract was performance.
Therefore, equity would treat any contract that it could order to
be specifically performed as if it had been performed.3 2 This idea
excluded from the conversion theory any contract that was
defective because it had not been properly formed,83 for exam-
ple, oral contracts that violate the Statute of Frauds. At the
other end of the continuum, it clearly included any contract that
was already completely performed.3 4 Equity courts would rarely
order specific performance of a defectively formed contract, and
would nearly always order specific performance of a contract
that had been completely performed by the buyer. The difficulty
with the doctrine lay in the stages in between those contracts
where neither party had performed (most frequently, the earnest
money contract) and contracts where part performance was still
owed (the installment contract). Some of these contracts would
be performed; some would not. There was no way to tell at the
time the court was presented with a problem, other than current
default of one of the parties, whether specific performance would
ultimately be appropriate.
The Washington court simply refused to consider the in-
betweens. A purchaser could not have specific performance, and
therefore could have no interest in the property, until the pur-
chaser's full performance had been tendered.3 5 Jurisdictions fol-
lowing the doctrine of equitable conversion had difficulty with
the in-betweens as well. Because the doctrine of equitable con-
version took effect immediately upon concluding an enforceable
contract,3 6 equitable conversion transferred all of the incidents
of ownership to the purchaser before the actual transfer, in
some instances, of any of the incidents of ownership.37
32. Id. at 14-17.
33. 3 AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.24.
34. Because land is unique, a contract for its sale may always be specifically per-
formed. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, at 126-27.
35. Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 P. 29 (1932).
36. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, §§ 11.22-.24.
37. For example, the risk of loss would shift to the buyer before transfer of posses-
sion, or any other incident of ownership. 3 AMEmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, §
11.30. See also 7 S. WEuLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTR cTS §§ 931-43 (W.
Jaeger 3d ed. 1963) for an in-depth discussion of risk of loss in installment contracts.
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Scholars such as Langdel 8 and Stone 9 demonstrated that
the property theory underlying equitable conversion did not
work well when a court could not determine whether a specifi-
cally enforceable contract would result at the time of suit."' It
often produced inequitable results in cases where none of the
incidents of ownership had been transferred to the buyer.41 Con-
versely, Washington courts quickly discovered that the doctrine,
or at least the notion behind it, separating real and personal
property where required, had some real utility.4 2 As the years
passed, the decisions in fact treated the seller's interest as per-
sonal property and recognized that a buyer who had some of the
incidents of ownership indeed had an interest in the property. 43
Jurisdictions following the doctrine of equitable conversion
made similar retreats from strict application of the doctrine and
recognized exceptions to deal with the in-between problems. 4'
In Cascade Security Bank v. Butler," the decision overrul-
ing Ashford, the court refused to adopt the doctrine of equitable
conversion as a rule of decision or even as a rule for guidance in
resolving future questions that might arise in the vendor-pur-
chaser relationship. This author believes that that was a wise
course of action, because neither approach faces the problem of
divided incidents of ownership present in the installment con-
tract setting. In addition, adopting the doctrine would have
thrown into question over fifty years of prior decisions that had
eroded the extreme statements in Ashford and had delineated
the rights and liabilities of buyer and seller in specific situations,
both as between themselves and between each of them and third
parties."
38. "Langdell's elaboration of the doctrine of equitable conversion, which is the clas-
sic American exposition from a theoretical standpoint, is as much legal geometry as is
Fearne's famous Essay." 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.22, at 64
(quoting C. LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1908)).
39. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1913).
40. An option setting is one example. Id. at 375-80.
41. An example is the typical earnest money situation where risk of loss is trans-
ferred to the buyer from the moment a binding agreement to purchase is entered into.
See S. WILLISTON, supra note 37, § 931.
42. For example, the doctrine is useful in deciding the nature of a decedent's inter-
est at death. In re Estate of Eilerman, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P.2d 763 (1934).
43. See supra notes 29-30.
44. For example, at least five different views have developed on how to allocate for-
tuitous losses between the parties. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.30.
45. 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631 (1977).
46. Hume, Incidents of the Vendor-Purchaser Relationship (Equitable Conver-
sion), 2 WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK ch. 36 (1980). Reasonable minds do dif-
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Nevertheless, the overruling of Ashford left lawyers and
courts unsure whether a useful framework within which to solve
vendor-purchaser problems existed in Washington. Recent deci-
sions reflect this lack of guidance. 7 The framework does exist,
however. An examination of the installment contract, with or
without a forfeiture clause, and in the context of the common-
law mortgage, helps to identify the framework and separate it
from the doctrine of equitable conversion.
III. THE MORTGAGE ANALOGY
Many have pointed out that the installment contract is a
financing device similar to a mortgage or trust deed. s What is
often ignored, however, is that the installment contract is virtu-
ally identical in form to the common-law mortgage. 4' The judi-
cial treatment of installment contracts in Washington is also
strikingly similar to the development of the common-law mort-
gage in equity.50 Recognition of this similarity provides the ini-
tial base upon which to build an analytical approach to a resolu-
tion of property rights in an installment contract.
Sellers who self-finance are free to use the mortgage, the
deed of trust, or the installment contract as a financing device.
The installment contract is popular in seller self-financing, how-
ever, because it may include a forfeiture clause, which is not per-
mitted in a mortgage or trust deed.51 The forfeiture clause offers
sellers three advantages in the event of failure of performance.
First, it is, at least theoretically, self-executing.5 2 Second, a seller
fer on this subject, however, and others believe that the doctrine of equitable conversion
would furnish a useful tool of construction. See Nock, Strait & Weaver, Equitable Con-
version in Washington: The Doctrine That Dares Not Speak Its Name, 1 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 121 (1977).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 91-103.
48. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 1.7, 3.25-
.32 (1979).
49. In the typical installment real estate contract, the seller keeps legal title to the
property until buyer has made all contract payments. Under the common-law mortgage,
the mortgagor transferred legal title to the real property that was to secure the debt to
the mortgagee. The transfer was either on condition subsequent, i.e., the estate trans-
ferred to the lender would end when the debt was repaid, or the borrower would have a
right of re-entry when the debt was repaid. G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
MORTGAGES § 5 (2d ed. 1970). Therefore, in both cases the lender is the party holding
actual legal title.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 58-59, 64-67.
51. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE chs. 61.12, 61.24 (1981).
52. E.g., Sleeper v. Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 88 P. 1036 (1907). A seller need only
declare her intention to forfeit, send proper notice if notice is required by the contract,
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electing forfeiture need not return to the buyer contract pay-
ments already made.' Finally, forfeiture is optional; the seller is
free to seek other remedies if they are more advantageous.' 4
The common-law mortgage also involved forfeiture. The
contract between the parties determined their rights and was
enforceable at law in strict accordance with the bargain made by
the parties." If the contract underlying the mortgage called for
payment on a certain day, and provided that the borrower-mort-
gagor lost any right to the property if payment was not prompt,
this agreement would be enforced at law.'e In addition, because
legal title was formally transferred to the lender, all of the inci-
dents of ownership associated with legal title also transferred to
the lender.' 7
Early Washington courts took a similar approach to forfei-
ture under real estate contracts. Forfeiture was granted for the
failure of the buyer to pay on time despite the harsh conse-
quences.'8 The law recognized then, as today, that the seller
technically is entitled to all of the incidents of ownership,
and the forfeiture is effective without further action. This feature of forfeiture often
proves illusory, however, because sellers must often litigate to clear title following forfei-
ture. G. OSBoNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.25 (1979).
Some sellers attempt to prevent the buyer from recording the contract for just this rea-
son. See Warren, California Installment Land Sales Contracts: A Time for Reform, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 608 (1962).
53. The other major advantage of forfeiture was that it avoided the necessity of
returning contract payments already made to the purchaser. If the contract did not
include a forfeiture clause, a seller who wished to rescind would also have to make resti-
tution to the buyer. See, e.g., Reidt v. Smith, 75 Wash. 365, 134 P. 1057 (1913). Early
decisions established that there was no injustice in permitting the seller to keep the
contract payments already made for two reasons: first, it was said to be unfair to require
the seller, without some compensation, to bear the risk of fluctuations in the value of the
land, and second, the parties were left to the bargain they struck, however harsh. See
Pease v. Baxter, 12 Wash. 567, 41 P. 899 (1895); Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. 178, 38 P.
1003 (1894); Drown v. Ingels, 3 Wash. 424, 28 P. 759 (1892).
54. Hogan v. Kyle, 7 Wash. 595, 35 P. 399 (1894) (damages); Underwood v. Tew, 7
Wash. 297, 34 P. 1100 (1893) (installments, as they fall due); Wood v. Mastick, 2 Wash.
Terr. 64, 3 P. 612 (1891) (specific performance).
There was some skirmishing over whether judgments for the purchase price or past-
due installments could be collected against other property of the buyer. After forbidding
the collection of a "deficiency judgment" in Barton v. Tombari, 120 Wash. 331, 337-38,
207 P. 239, 241-42 (1922), the court approved enforcement of judgments for overdue
installments against other property of buyers and distinguished its earlier ruling. Stevens
v. Irwin, 132 Wash. 289, 293, 231 P. 783, 785 (1925).
55. G. OSBORNE, supra note 49, § 5.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 53.
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including possession, because the seller holds legal title.59
Equity gradually relieved common-law mortgagors from the
harshness of losing their land for delays in meeting the payment
called for by the mortgage contract.60 Courts frequently granted
a grace period within which the borrower could pay the debt and
recover or "redeem" the land. At first, the right was granted
only in cases where other equitable grounds for relief were
shown by the borrower.0 " Finally, however, the grant of a grace
period was so common that the mortgagor was described as hav-
ing an "equity of redemption." The equity of redemption was in
theory full equitable ownership of the property securing the
debt.62
The idea that the incidents of ownership normally associ-
ated with legal title were not held solely by the lender-mortga-
gee but rather had been divided between the lender and the bor-
rower developed along with the equity of redemption. Central to
this recognition was equity's insistence that the land was only
security. It did not, therefore, seem appropriate that the lender
who held legal title to the property only as security should have
all of the associated incidents of ownership. Increasingly, equity
found that the borrower-mortgagor rather than the lender-mort-
gagee had the right to important incidents of ownership such as
possession."
Washington courts also began to relieve installment con-
tract buyers from forfeiture by granting them a grace period
within which to bring payments current, or to pay the entire
purchase price and receive the land.' Also apparent from the
cases is a steady trend increasing the property rights of install-
ment contract buyers." Although only one case characterizes the
59. See Welch v. Hover-Schiffner Co., 75 Wash. 130, 134 P. 526 (1913). See gener-
ally 3 AmmucAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.25.
60. 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 13, § 1180.
61. G. OSBORNE, supra note 47, § 6.
62. 4 J. POMEROY, supra note 13, §§ 1180-81.
63. Id. § 1181.
64. The theory is that the seller has waived the right to insist on strict performance
in accordance with the "time is of the essence" clause if the seller has accepted late
payments. The seller must then give the buyer notice of intention to insist on strict
performance and an opportunity to cure defaults. Douglas v. Hanbury, 56 Wash. 63, 66,
104 P. 1110, 1112 (1909). See also Bulmon v. Bailey, 22 Wash. 2d 372, 377, 156 P.2d 231,
233 (1945), and Shaw v. Morrison, 145 Wash. 420, 424-25, 260 P. 266, 266-67 (1927). A
buyer is not automatically entitled to the grace period within which to cure, but the
cases granting an opportunity to cure on waiver grounds are legion.
65. See supra note 29.
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buyer's interest as full equitable ownership," others describe the
buyer's property as "the beneficial interest and real ownership of
land. ' '" 7 Recent cases also note the security function served by
the installment contract."
Equity courts' recognition of rights in a borrower whose
lender held legal title to the property securing repayment of the
debt had, of course, absolutely nothing to do with the doctrine
of equitable conversion." Washington courts, also totally with-
out use of the doctrine, recognized that installment contract
buyers have rights associated with real property in much the
same way the equity courts increased those of the mortgagor.70
This author suggests, therefore, that judicial recognition of the
installment contract buyer's rights in Washington is due to tacit
recognition that the installment contract buyer, like the com-
mon-law mortgagor, is intended to enjoy the beneficial use of the
property during the life of the contract. It is not due to the coin-
cidence that the doctrine of equitable conversion also trans-
ferred beneficial ownership of the property under contract to the
buyer.
The mortgage analogy, particularly its security underpin-
ning, should not be carried too far. The installment real estate
contract has unique features that must be recognized for mean-
ingful problem-solving. First, there are different kinds of con-
tracts, and all contracts, in some sense, function as security for
buyer's promises. The contracts may be distinguished, however,
because some, principally installment contracts, divide incidents
of ownership associated with real property between the parties.
Others, such as the typical earnest money contract, do not.
Whether the buyer has one of these incidents of ownership
should be significant in deciding whether the buyer has the
66. Snuffin v. Mayo, 6 Wash. App. 525, 528, 494 P.2d 497, 499 (1972).
67. Committee of Protesting Citizens v. Val Vue Sewer Dist., 14 Wash. App. 838,
842, 545 P.2d 42, 44 (1976). See also Pratt v. Rhodes, 142 Wash. 411, 416, 253 P. 640, 641
(1927), where the purchaser's interest was characterized as an "equitable interest," and
Freeborn v. Seattle Trust, 94 Wash. 2d 336, 340, 617 P.2d 424, 427 (1980), where the
court states that in Cascade Bank it characterized the purchaser's interest as "real
property."
68. Freeborn v. Seattle Trust, 94 Wash. 2d 336, 617 P.2d 424 (1980); Terry v. Born,
24 Wash. App. 652, 604 P.2d 504 (1979).
69. The equitable maxim supporting intervention in the common-law mortgage was
that equity "regarded form rather than substance." This was a specialized application of
the equitable maxim that underlay equitable conversion, "equity regards that as done
which ought to be done." 2 J. POMEROy, supra note 13, § 376.
70. See supra note 29.
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property right or duty associated with it. Second, breach of a
real estate contract entitles the nonbreaching party to a remedy
that may affect the initial contractual division of incidents of
ownership.
IV. SEPARATING CONTRACT QUESTIONS FROM PROPERTY
QUESTIONS
Both the doctrine of equitable conversion and its Ashford
mirror image failed to consider the actual contractual provisions
when attempting to decide which party had a right or duty asso-
ciated with the real property that was the subject of the con-
tract. However, there is no particular need to recognize property
rights in a purchaser unless the contract itself allocates to the
purchaser some incident of ownership associated with the prop-
erty right. Consequently, the first inquiry should be the terms of
the contract itself. If the contract has transferred an incident of
ownership, such as possession, to the buyer, any property right
attendant upon possession should likewise be transferred. Next,
a court must consider the status of the contract. If the contract
has been breached and the remedy for that breach terminates
the contract, the contract allocation of incidents of ownership
should be disregarded. Finally, the labels "real" and "personal"
property should be avoided unless there is a willingness to
acknowledge that these labels may change along with changes in
the status of the contract.
A. Contract Allocation of the Incident of Ownership
Some of the post-Ashford courts struggled with the question
of whether to permit contract purchasers to exercise a right nor-
mally dependent upon the legal ownership of real property, such
as the right to sue a trespasser.7 1 In these cases, defendants uni-
formly cited the broad statements in Ash ford and argued that
purchasers did not have a property interest sufficient to support
the suit.72 Although not explicit in the opinions, in each case the
court looked to the manner in which the contract allocated the
incident of ownership in question and permitted the party to
whom the critical incident was given to maintain suit.
71. Kateiva v. Snyder, 143 Wash. 172, 254 P. 857 (1927).
72. See supra note 29. See generally Hume, Incidents of the Vendor-Purchaser
Relationship (Equitable Conversion), 2 WASHMGTON REAL PROPERTY DESK BOOK ch. 36
(1980).
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The right to possession is a critical right since it is one of
the incidents of property ownership upon which other rights and
duties often depend.7 8 This right normally rests with the seller
as the holder of legal title.74 The standard installment contract,
however, gives this right to the buyer. 75 In the post-Ashford
cases, courts decided that if the buyer had the right to posses-
sion, it was enough to permit the buyer to recover for trespass,"T
share in the proceeds of a condemnation award,7 7 protect the
property from seizure by the seller's trustee in bankruptcy,7 s and
protest the formation of a special district that would include the
property being purchased.79 Not even possession was needed in
order for a buyer to protect his contract right to receive legal
title by intervening in a quiet title action brought against the
seller.8 0 With logical symmetry, where the court treated the
agreement as an earnest money that did not give the right to
possession to the purchaser, it refused to permit the purchaser
to sue for trespass.8 "
In all of these decisions, the argument that the purchaser
had no interest in the property was routinely dismissed by the
courts; they looked to the nature of the right asserted and deter-
mined that the contracts had given an incident of ownership
associated with them to the purchaser. Such an inquiry should
not overlook the possibility that both parties may have a pro-
tectable interest supporting a right to sue, and that the right
need not be based on the possession of either real or personal
property. For example, it may also be appropriate to permit the
seller to sue the trespasser for damage to the real property,
which, after all, is the seller's security. In other words, it is
appropriate to look to the contract to determine the protectable
73. Examples are the right to crops growing on the land, Churchill v. Ackerman, 22
Wash. 227, 60 P. 406 (1900), and the right to collect rents, Erckenbrack v. Jenkins, 33
Wash. 2d 126, 204 P.2d 831 (1949).
74. See supra note 59.
75. See standard form A-1964, in Falconer, Real Estate Contracts, WASmNGTON
REAL PROPERTY DESK BOOK ch. 37, standard form A-1964 at SU 37-25. Forms other than
A-1964 are used in counties in Eastern Washington. E.g., Form 1415, Yakima County.
76. Lawson v. Helmich, 20 Wash. 2d 167, 146 P.2d 537 (1944); Peters v. Bellingham
Coal Mines, 173 Wash. 123, 21 P.2d 1024 (1933).
77. Pierce County v. King, 47 Wash. 2d 328, 287 P.2d 316 (1955).
78. Culmback v. Stevens, 158 Wash. 675, 291 P. 705 (1930).
79. Committee of Protesting Citizens v. Val Vue Sewer Dist., 14 Wash. App. 838,
545 P.2d 42 (1976).
80. Turpen v. Johnson, 26 Wash. 2d 716, 175 P.2d 495 (1946).
81. Allen v. Mickelson, 43 Wash. 2d 509, 262 P.2d 1024 (1953).
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interest of each party without further labeling.
Looking to the contract allocation of the incident of owner-
ship should also produce sensible and desirable distinctions
between earnest money contracts and installment contracts. The
two different agreements typically allocate the incidents of
ownership between the parties in very different ways. The
installment buyer should, like the mortgagor, possess more"property" rights because the contract has transferred more
incidents of ownership to that buyer.
The analysis can be tested further by using the Ashford
facts. 2 Following the destruction of the property, Mrs. Reese,
the buyer, wanted rescission of the contract and restitution of all
payments she had previously made. The Ashford-Reese contract
was silent as to which party would bear a fortuitous loss."8 When
the contract is silent, one way to decide which party bears the
loss is to place the loss on the party with "title"-either equita-
ble title, as with the doctrine of equitable conversion," or legal
title, as in Ashford.85 This formalistic approach first applies a
property label. Once the label is applied, any further questions
are solved by reference to the label. In the process, however, the
contract between the parties, particularly the allocation of the
incidents of ownership between them, is ignored.
Further examination of the contract, however, suggests a
less formalistic, more policy-oriented method for decision. Mrs.
Reese had possession. Where the loss occurs when one of the
parties to the contract is in possession of the subject matter of
the contract, it is logical to place the loss on that party, because
the party in possession is in the better position to protect and
insure the property.88 This is the position taken by the Uniform
Vendor and Purchaser Risk of Loss Act," and is an exception to
the allocation of risk of loss otherwise resulting from application
82. 132 Wash. 649, 233 P. 29.
83. Had the contract allocated risk of loss, the agreement between the parties would
have been honored. E.g., Gillingham v. Phelps, 5 Wash. 2d 410, 412, 105 P.2d 825, 826
(1940) (personal property).
84. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.30, at 90.
85. 132 Wash. 649, 650, 233 P. 29, 30.
86. S. WILLISTON, supra note 37, §§ 931-43. See also U.C.C. § 2-509 (1978). Title has
been abandoned as a method for allocating risk of loss in sales of goods.
87. UNIFORM VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK OF Loss ACT (1935). See Pierce County
v. King, 47 Waqh. 2d 328, 332, 287 P.2d 316, 319 (1955), citing the UNIFORM ACT with
approval in allocating loss resulting from condemnation. The UNIFORM LAND TRANSAC-
TIONS ACT § 2-406 (1975) adopts the same position.
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of the doctrine of equitable conversion in some states.88
The fact that Mrs. Reese had the risk of loss under the sug-
gested analysis does not necessarily mean that she could not
have the relief she sought. If the loss caused a breach of con-
tract, Mrs. Reese was entitled to an appropriate remedy. The
remedy might affect who ultimately would bear the risk of loss,
but it would do so for reasons other than the formalistic applica-
tion of property labels. In addition, the remedy requested in a
particular case can and should affect the ultimate allocation of
benefits and burdens between the parties to the contract, as well
as the rights of third parties vis-a-vis the parties to the contract.
B. The Status of the Contract or "The Remedial
Connection"
The status of the contract is very important. Most cases are
presented to courts in the context of a breach for which a rem-
edy is sought. If a court determines that the appropriate reme-
dial award terminates the contract, all of the incidents of owner-
ship may be reassociated with legal title. This may extinguish
any property interest in the buyer and change the characteriza-
tion of the nature of the seller's interest from personal to real
property.8 9 Because the property labels may change with
changes in the status of the contract, it is important to decide
the remedial question first.
Again, the Ashford facts can be used to test the analysis.
Mr. Ashford could no longer deliver his promised performance
because of the destruction of part of the subject matter of the
contract. Leaving aside property labels, he would either be
excused from performing his obligation on grounds of impracti-
cability of performance, 0 or be in breach. If his duties were
excused, Mrs. Reese was entitled to suspend her own perform-
ance.9 If in breach, Mrs. Reese could suspend her performance
if the breach was material, and seek restitution of payments pre-
88. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.30.
89. A similar process, called "reconversion," existed in conjunction with the doctrine
of equitable conversion. When an equitable conversion had been effected by instructions
in a will to sell real property and distribute the money, the beneficiaries could, under
appropriate circumstances, elect to take the property in its unconverted form. This elec-
tion resulted in a reconversion of the property into its original form. 4 J. POMEROY, supra
note 13, §§ 1175-78; Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1379 (1941); see, e.g., Estate of Morgan, 568 P.2d
892 (Wyo. 1977).
90. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 263.
91. Id. §§ 267-68.
[Vol. 7:233
Dispelling the Ashford Cloud
viously made on the contract.2 If restitution was awarded, Mr.
Ashford would suffer the loss because of the status of the con-
tract, not because he held legal title. If, however, the breach was
not material, the contract was still in effect. Mrs. Reese would
have the risk of loss because she had possession. She might be
entitled to damages for the loss, such as an abatement of the
purchase price, but this would be because of the breach of the
contract and not because Mr. Ashford had the risk of loss. 93
It is especially important to determine the status of the con-
tract when exercise of a forfeiture remedy is claimed. Proper
exercise of the forfeiture clause terminates the buyer's right to
continue performance and ends the contract.9 4 Once the contract
is ended, all incidents of ownership are reassociated with legal
title. It is then inappropriate after forfeiture to recognize a prop-
erty interest in the buyer or any interest in any third party that
was dependent upon the buyer's property interest.
Cascade Security Bank v. Butler95 serves as an example of
the difficulty that could be encountered unless a determination
of the propriety of forfeiture is made before deciding the nature
and extent of property interests. The Cascade Bank court held
that a purchaser under a partly performed installment contract
had "real estate" within the meaning of the judgment lien stat-
ute.9 6 This is appropriate because if the contract is completed
the buyer will have full legal ownership of the property involved.
The buyer's creditor should be able to establish its priority on
92. Id. §§ 237, 241.
93. E.g., Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Convey, 175 Wash. 224, 27 P.2d 136 (1933).
The author does not suggest by this analysis that the applicable contract doctrine is
"better," or more likely to produce certainty. What is suggested, however, is that use of
these rules, rather than property labels, is more likely to take account of the actual cir-
cumstances of the parties and therefore, is more likely to produce fair results.
. 94. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 11.76, at 191. In theory, forfei-
ture is foreclosure of the vendor's lien by operation of a condition subsequent contained
in the contract. The vendor's lien, in the retained title situation, is an equitable right,
derived from legal title to compel the buyer to perform the contract by paying the
purchase price or bar the buyer's rights under the contract. Id. This should be distin-
guished from the vendor's lien sometimes claimed after legal title has been transferred
in order to give the unpaid seller priority over others by means of a lien on the property
transferred. The latter has been disapproved of in Washington because it is a "secret"
lien and because the seller has the remedy of execution against the land after securing a
judgment for the purchase price. Smith v. Allen, 18 Wash. 1, 50 P. 783 (1897). See also
Shelton v. Jones, 4 Wash. 692, 30 P. 1061 (1892) for a good discussion of the distinction
between the vendor's lien and the equitable lien arising from a title retention contract.
95. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
96. 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631.
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this asset at the time of judgment and recover its judgment
against the buyer's equity in the event that the buyer sells her
interest prior to completion of the contract. If, however, the
buyer's rights are extinguished by appropriate forfeiture, the
judgment creditor's lien should also be extinguished."
C. Application of the Analysis
A recent decision contains facts permitting application of all
of the elements of analysis previously discussed. It is also an
excellent example of the confusion that lingers despite the over-
ruling of Ashford. In Reed v. Eller," the parties entered into a
real estate purchase agreement that was called an "earnest
money." This agreement provided that a standard installment
contract would be entered into by the parties when the contract
balance had been reduced to a specific amount. 9 Although this
agreement was called an "earnest money" contract, it gave pos-
session to the buyer, permitted payment of the purchase price in
installments through an escrow agent, and contained a forfeiture
clause. When the buyer fell behind in payments, the sellers
attempted to exercise their rights under the forfeiture clause
and resold the property, again on an installment contract, to
other buyers.
The Washington Court of Appeals applied the waiver and
estoppel rules normally applied to forfeiture of standard install-
ment contracts, despite the fact that the parties had called their
agreement an "earnest money." The court was clearly correct in
so holding. It recognized that the parties had allocated the inci-
dents of ownership between themselves in a manner more like
the standard installment contract than the typical earnest
money. The court then ruled that the sellers had improperly
97. This follows from the general principle that a creditor acquires no greater right
in an asset than is possessed by its debtor. Vandin v. McCleary Timber Co., 157 Wash.
635, 289 P. 1016 (1930). Any attempt to decide the creditor's interest in the property
without first determining the status of the contract could result in giving the creditor
greater rights in the property than its debtor possesses. For example, the lien of the
creditor on the real estate of the seller disappears when the contract is performed, and
apparently will not attach at all if the contract has been fully performed prior to the
docketing of the judgment or execution under the statute. Heath v. Dodson, 7 Wash. 2d
667, 110 P.2d 845 (1941) (dicta). The statute construed in Cascade Bank has been
amended to provide that the vendor's interest is not real estate within the meaning of
the statute. 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 45, 1st Ex. Sess. (West).
98. 33 Wash. App. 820, 664 P.2d 515 (1983).
99. Id. at 821-22, 664 P.2d at 516.
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exercised their forfeiture rights under the contract and rein-
stated the agreement. 100
The court then faced the question of priority between the
original and subsequent purchasers. Here its analysis went awry.
The court held that the subsequent purchasers could not be
"bona fide purchasers" who could prevail over the original pur-
chaser because they did not have legal title.10 1 In its opinion, the
court indicated that although Ash ford had been overruled, the
doctrine of equitable conversion is not in effect, and Cascade
Bank does not ". . . alter the legal title requirement of the bona
fide purchaser rule." 10 12 In so doing, the court abdicated its
responsibility to look for principles outside of the doctrine of
equitable conversion in order to solve the priority problem, and
thereby confirmed that the effects of Ashford still linger.
In fact, the doctrine of equitable conversion would not have
solved the priority problem in Reed. The doctrine would simply
have transferred equitable estates to both parties,10 3 leaving the
court with the same problem-which of the competing equities
prevails. Regardless of the label it used to describe the buyer's
interest, after the Reed court decided that the forfeiture was
improper on the first contract, it was left with two buyers, each
possessing the right to complete the contract and receive legal
title to the property. Neither buyer yet had legal title to the
property; title remained with the seller. The court should, there-
fore, have ignored the location of legal title and decided which
buyer had priority, because the buyers' interests were identical
except as to the time of creation.'"
One of the arguments made to the court in Reed illustrates
the danger that the same simplistic arguments that followed in
the wake of Ashford 0 5 will be made again, albeit clothed in Cas-
cade Bank rhetoric. The subsequent purchasers in Reed argued
that the most applicable precedent, Peterson v. Paulson,10 6 had
been overruled sub silentio by the Cascade Bank decision, and
that Cascade Bank refused to adopt the doctrine of equitable
100. Id. at 826, 664 P.2d at 518.
101. Id. at 827, 664 P.2d at 518.
102. Id. at 827, n.2, 664 P.2d at 518, n.2.
103. See supra text accompanying note 24.
104. 2 J. POMERoY, supra note 13, §§ 413-15.
105. E.g., Kateiva v. Snyder, 143 Wash. 172, 254 P. 857 (1927). See supra text
accompanying note 72.
106. 24 Wash. 2d 166, 163 P.2d 830 (1945).
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conversion. Two implications are present in this argument: one,
all post-Ashford, pre-Cascade Bank decisions may have been
overruled, and two, because Cascade Bank did not adopt the
doctrine of equitable conversion, we are left with a body of over-
ruled cases and no principles with which to replace them.
The answer to this contention is that between Ashford and
Cascade Bank, the court decided many cases that recognized
and defined both the seller's and purchaser's interest in property
subject to a real estate contract. 10 7 Cascade Bank confirmed
rather than overruled these cases, and its refusal to overlay a
foreign body of doctrine-the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion-acknowledges this.108 The main thing the court said in
Cascade Bank was that it no longer wanted to hear simplistic
Ashford arguments.109 One can surmise that the court might
have as little interest in simplistic post-Cascade Bank
arguments.
This author suggests that we are not merely cast adrift
without principles to solve priority problems, as in Reed, simply
because we do not have the doctrine of equitable conversion.
Common law has developed doctrines to establish priorities
among equitable interests.110 These principles would also be
appropriate in many instances to solve installment contract
priorities.""
107. See supra notes 29-30. See generally Hume, supra note 46.
108. 88 Wash. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631.
109. It is interesting that Ashford was overruled in a factually dissimilar case. Ash-
ford could easily have been distinguished in Cascade Bank, as the court had done so
many times before. Why then overrule? An answer is suggested in Radin, The Trail of
the Calf, 32 CORNELL L. Rsv. 137 (1946).
The term "overrule" in practice means just that. It means: "Do not cite this
case hereafter in your arguments." For lawyers in citing cases rarely consider
the actual case involved but merely use the opinion in order to cull from it
such general statements as they think will afford good major premises for their
own conclusions. It is just these general statements which the court has
decided to reject and their "overruling" enforces this rejection.
Id. at 143.
110. The basic common-law rule, both in law and equity, was "first in time, first in
right." An exception was made when the prior interest was equitable and the subsequent
interest was legal. In that case, the later interest would prevail if the holder of the later
legal claim was a purchaser for value without notice. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 13, §§ 17.1-.3. See also G. OSBORNE, supra note 49, §§ 182-84.
111. Recording acts alter common-law priorities for interests included in the act.
Executory contracts are excluded from the definition of "conveyance" in the Washington
Act. WASH. REv. CODE § 65.08.060(3) (1981). Executory contracts, however, may be
recorded and will give notice. WASH. Rav. CODE § 65.08.080 (1981).
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V. CONCLUSION
Real estate contract problems are analytically penetrable
without the doctrine of equitable conversion. Analysis requires
greater attention to the real estate contract itself, to possible
breach of the contract, and to remedies for breach before
attempting to decide the property questions associated with the
contract. Most of all, sensible solution of real estate contract
problems requires an exorcism of the ghost of Ashford and its
method of reasoning. It is neither necessary nor desirable to
reject all post-Ashford, pre-Cascade Bank cases as infected with
the inappropriate Ashford reasoning. Nor is it necessary or
desirable to select the doctrine of equitable conversion as a pan-
acea. Analysis under the doctrine suffers from the same deficien-
cies as the reasoning in Ashford. Careful analysis can avoid for-
malistic solutions, and produce a desirable blend of principles
that will furnish predictability and fairness for the parties to
real estate contracts.
1984] 257
